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WOMEN’S WORK CHOICES IN KENYA: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
AND HOUSEHOLD GENDER ATTITUDES 
 
 
Giovanna De Giusti and Uma Sarada Kambhampati 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study considers the factors that influence women’s work behavior in Kenya. In 
particular, it examines whether gender attitudes and certain types of social institutions 
influence the probability of employment or type of employment for women. Using data from 
the Demographic and Health Survey of 2008–9, we find that religion and ethnicity are 
significant determinants of women’s employment in Kenya. While personal experience of 
female genital mutilation is insignificant, spousal age and education differences, as well as 
marital status (which reflect attitudes both in women’s natal and marital families), are 
significant determinants of women’s employment choices. 
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HEADER: WOMEN’S WORK CHOICES IN KENYA 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is increasingly accepted that women are a country’s “hidden resource. Investing in women 
and girls now will increase productivity in this generation and will promote sustainable 
growth, peace, and better health for the next generation” (British Council 2012: p.i]). In this 
context, women’s employment is crucial because it can be harnessed for economic growth 
and family prosperity, and also because it is seen as helpful in empowering women and 
thereby improving family welfare. Increasing women’s work opportunities translates into 
better economic and welfare outcomes for women (Kivan Munshi and Mark Rosenzweig 
2006; Nancy Qian 2008; Robert T. Jensen 2010), and women’s economic empowerment can 
improve household welfare (Esther Duflo 2012). 
In this paper, we consider factors that influence women’s employment in Kenya. In 
particular, we are concerned with the role of traditional gender attitudes and sociocultural 
institutions in determining women’s labor force participation. Not surprisingly, these attitudes 
are themselves endogenous to whether women undertake work. In particular, it is often 
acknowledged that certain types of jobs (those in the modern sector of the economy or those 
that take the woman outside of the home) are more likely to engender women’s autonomy.  
We attempt to address this potential reverse causality by using proxies for these 
attitudes before the woman begins work. One way to do this is to consider the impact of 
sociocultural institutions, such as religion and ethnicity, which are likely to be exogenous and 
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capture a reduced form effect of such attitudes on women’s employment.1 A second approach 
is to consider gender attitudes more specifically through the inclusion of variables reflecting 
the circumstances in which the woman was born and into which she has married. Such 
variables include whether the woman was circumcised, whether she is in a polygynous 
relationship, her age and education relative to her husband, and her age at first marriage.  
To the extent that these proxies are not completely exogenous, our results need to be 
interpreted as correlations rather than as identifying causality. We find that even after 
controlling for a range of family and sociodemographic factors, religion and ethnicity are 
significantly correlated with women’s employment prospects, particularly with restricting 
women’s work outside the household. Among the more specific household gender attitude 
variables, we find that polygyny and the woman’s age and education gap relative to her 
husband are especially significant. Women who are in polygynous unions work more, though 
they are mostly self-employed. Additionally, closeness in age and education between the 
spouses is associated with an increase in the probability of women undertaking paid work, 
particularly outside of the household.  
This paper makes a contribution to the literature on women’s labor force participation 
in three ways. First, very few papers look at the impact of institutions on labor market 
behavior, especially in developing countries. However, in an analysis of whether women 
undertake paid work and, if so, the kinds of jobs they do, the impact of these institutions is 
likely to be key. This is because, by framing gender-relevant meanings and defining gender 
roles, they influence the distribution of power between men and women in the private sphere 
of the family, in the economic sphere, and in public life, thereby shaping women’s economic 
and social opportunities (Boris Branisa, Stephan Klasen, and Maria Ziegler 2010). This paper 
looks at the dense network of sociocultural institutions that exists in Kenya but also considers 
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the extent to which the gender norms underlying these religious and ethnic institutions are 
important in influencing women’s labor force participation.  
Second, we have identified proxies for initial patriarchal attitudes which, in the 
context of Kenya, attempt to avoid the problem of reverse causality from employment back to 
gender attitudes. We do this by appealing to the fact that women in Kenya start paid work late 
and marry early indicating that in most cases, they will be married before their work 
experience could influence their marital choices. While there is a possibility that women 
might anticipate their employment choices in choosing whom to marry and when, this seems 
on average unlikely when the vast majority of women are employed in ‘survival’ businesses 
and family employment (see Aderanti Adepoju and Christine Oppong [1994]; Martha Chen, 
Joann Vanek, Francie Lund, James Heintz, Renana Jhabvals, and Christine Bonner [2005]; 
and Marty Chen [2008]). In addition, the slow rates of change of social institutions and 
gender attitudes are likely to further limit reverse causality.  
It is also possible that a woman’s choices are influenced more by her community’s 
attitude than by her own personal views. To account for this, we analyze the impact of 
religion and ethnicity on the labor participation decision. While employment which exposes 
women to liberal attitudes outside the home, might erode patriarchal attitudes over time, this 
is unlikely in the case of our sample for a number of reasons. First, figures indicate that 
women’s employment in Kenya is mostly within the family or is self-employment. Such 
employment is unlikely to lead to exposure to liberal values (International Labor 
Organization [ILO] 2008; Anderson and Easwaran 2009).2  Second, such changes in attitude 
take time (Alberto Bisin and Thierry Verdier 2000; Herbert Gintis 2001), and in our sample, 
we see that most women are actually married before they begin paid work. In this context, the 
proxies we have chosen are likely to remain exogenous.  
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Third, we distinguish between various work options – work for family, work for 
outsiders, and self-employment – each of which we expect to be differently affected by these 
social and gender institutions. In particular, while work for family may be encouraged and 
self-employment tolerated, work for outsiders may be taboo (Claudia Goldin [1994]; Sarah 
Salway, Shahana Rahman, and Sonia Jesmin [2003]; for an overview on women’s work in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, see Chen [2008]).  
Salway, Rahman, and Jesmin (2003) find that, despite women’s work being 
necessitated by poverty in Dhaka, both sociocultural constraints and persistent social stigma 
limit women’s employment. In this regard, Goldin (1994) claims that social norms may limit 
the ability of women to accept paid employment (especially in manual jobs), and these norms 
appear to apply to wives but not to unmarried women. Existing literature, for example, argues 
that polygyny enables the husband to control the labor power of his wives, leading to an 
increased probability of women working for their families or for themselves rather than for 
outside employers (Esther Boserup 1970; Hanan G. Jacoby 1995; Salway, Rahman, and 
Jesmin 2003). In Bangladesh, however, Salway, Rahman, and Jesmin (2003) observe that 
women often give up work after marriage because their husband’s demand it or because they 
have restricted time. By analyzing work for the family, for outsiders, and self-employment 
separately, we are able to identify the effects of norms and institutions on each of these work 
options. 
Before proceeding further, a caveat is in order. Despite our efforts to deal with the 
issue of endogeneity, our solutions are necessarily second best. Our estimations attempt to 
deal with reverse causality using a variety of proxies, which we argue are likely to be 
exogenous, though it is hard to establish this beyond a doubt. Given the nature of the model 
being estimated (with a discrete dependent variable) and the difficulty of finding an 
appropriate instrument, it has not been possible to estimate an instrumental variable model.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
While the factors influencing women’s employment have been analyzed by many authors 
(Nadia Steiber and Barbara Haas 2012), few studies have looked at the impact of 
sociocultural institutions on women’s labor force participation. To the extent that this issue 
has been studied, most researchers have concentrated on sociocultural norms in Western 
market economies (Nicole M. Fortin 2005; Lídia Farré and Francis Vella 2013; Raquel 
Fernández 2013). Yet, evidence and reports by the International Labour Organisation (ILO 
2008) and United Nations Development Fund for Women (Chen et al. 2005) show that in 
many developing countries gendered norms (relating to women’s work and men’s work) 
shape the labor market and the position of women within it.  
Christian Morisson and Johannes P. Jutting (2005), in analyzing this issue across 
developing countries, consider the impact of a range of economic and non-economic 
variables on the proportion of actively employed women in each country. Analyzing the 
impact of gender institutions (including polygyny, female genital mutilations, early marriage, 
authority over children, right to inherit from the husband, right of ownership, and freedom of 
movement and dress) on women’s employment, they find evidence that social institutions are 
a major determinant of women’s employment. This study, however, aggregates at the level of 
countries and is therefore unable to comment on differences across households and also 
intrahousehold relationships, which might influence employment status. It is worth noting (as 
is discussed further below) that employment will also influence a woman’s status by shifting 
her income share relative to that of her husband’s, thereby changing the intrahousehold 
bargaining power (Kaushik Basu 2006). 
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Fortin (2005) estimates the impact of gender attitudes on the gender gap in labor force 
participation and earnings across twenty-five Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. She finds that perceptions of men as breadwinners and 
women as homemakers are strongly and positively associated with the gender gap in 
employment rates and earnings across countries. While Fortin concentrates on the supply side 
of this decision, it is worth noting that gender role attitudes are also likely to influence an 
employer’s decisions about whom to hire, to which positions, and how much to pay them. 
Fortin also warns that many of her results “should be more precisely referred to as partial 
correlations, rather than causal factors” (420).  
Diane Elson (1999) distinguishes between labor force participation (including all 
kinds of work done by women) and labor market participation (which excludes unpaid family 
workers who do not enter the labor market). She argues that instead of being gender neutral, 
labor markets are the “bearers of gender”[please insert page number], and therefore carry 
social stereotypes about what is men’s work and what should be done by women. This 
distinction is crucial to our analysis as we distinguish between work for family, work for 
outsiders, and self-employment. 
Basu (2006) articulates the endogeneity inherent in women’s labor force participation 
when he argues that a woman’s work activity is an outcome of her existing bargaining power 
but her say in household matters (autonomy) is, in turn, determined by her work. Thus, there 
is likely to be two-way causality between autonomy and labor participation so that the 
balance of power within the household influences household choices but these choices can in 
turn affect the household’s balance of power. This endogeneity makes it difficult to use direct 
autonomy measures (emotional, physical, and decision-making autonomy, for instance) of the 
kind that are made available in the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) datasets and have 
often been used in the literature (Michelle J. Hindin 2000; Shireen J. Jejeebhoy 2002; Farré 
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and Vella 2013). The inclusion of age at first marriage, age, and education gaps relative to the 
husband in our estimation help to capture these intra-household dynamics in our model.  
 
 
THE KENYAN CONTEXT 
 
Kenya is a good country in which to analyze the impact of social institutions on employment 
because it contains a number of religions and over seventy ethnicities. Kenya is a 
predominantly Christian country, with a significant number of Muslims and a small minority 
belonging to other religions (such as Hindus) and traditional beliefs (see Table 1). Sixty-two 
percent of the women in our sample are Protestant Christian; while 19 percent are Catholics 
and 15 percent Muslim. Of the Protestant Christian women in our sample, 26 percent are not 
employed, while 23 percent work for outsiders. These values are similar for the Roman 
Catholic women (30 and 22 percent, respectively). The highest percentage of women not 
employed is in the Muslim group (64 percent), and in the “other religions” category (68 
percent), which also exhibits the lowest percentage of women working for outsiders (7 
percent). 
(Table 1 here) 
 
As Table 1 shows, our sample is spread across twelve distinct ethnic groups (including a 
“miscellaneous” category). The largest ethnic group in our sample is the Kikuyus (19 percent 
of women), followed by Luhyas (14.6 percent of women) and Luos (12.6 percent of women). 
Previous studies indicate that the Somali and Masai groups are the most traditional as far as 
women’s roles are concerned (Hodgson 2000)[please add Hodgson to the references list]. 
This is confirmed by our data, which show that 80 percent of Somali and 60 percent of Masai 
women in our sample are not employed. In contrast, amongst the Embu and Kisii, less than 
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20 percent of women are not employed. Embu women, as well as Kikuyu, Kamba, Meru, and 
Taita/Taveta women, are more likely to work for outsiders. Self-employment is most 
common among the Kisii. Including ethnicity in our model will help to pick up the effect of 
all norms that are not explicitly included in our model. In this sense, ethnicity is a residual 
catchall variable for sociocultural institutions. 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Our aim in this paper is to consider the impact that social institutions have on the probability 
of paid work for women, as well as on the type of work women do. In this context, we 
include ethnicity and religion as a set of formal institutions that might encompass society’s 
attitudes toward women’s employment and gender attitudes as a set of informal institutions 
that more specifically influence women’s role in society. 
There are a number of social institutions that prescribe either formally or informally 
what can and cannot be done by various agents within societies. Such norms could influence 
the gendered division of labor within the home (housework and childcare being seen as 
women’s responsibilities, for instance), the gender division of labor outside the home (certain 
jobs not being open to women, for example), or the acceptability of women working outside 
the home (Bina Agarwal 1997), as well as the demand for women in the labor market. Such 
norms might, for instance, be so pervasive that women do not feel able to work outside the 
home and employers are also less willing to employ women. Since this would influence one 
of the three labor market options that we test – employment outside the home – we might 
expect more women to be employed within the family or to become self-employed. Thus, 
while such norms might influence women’s labor market participation (Elson 1999), they are 
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less likely to affect labor force participation. Separating out the type of paid work done by 
women (work for family, outsiders, and self) will enable us to capture this.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
To address the research question, we estimate two models – first, the factors determining 
whether women are employed and, second, the factors influencing the kinds of work women 
do. These models are estimated across two samples – the sample including all women 
between 21–49 years of age, and a sample of married women. We do this for two reasons. 
First, it is likely that married women might have different constraints on, or motivations for, 
their behavior than women who are single. In particular, it would be informative to capture 
the effect of norms in their husband’s family. Second, there are also intrahousehold 
bargaining issues that are likely to influence the married woman’s employment status. These 
differences in bargaining power are proxied by variables such as relative age, relative 
education of the partners, or even age at first marriage or type of marriage (monogyny, 
polygyny etc.), which are included in the model estimated on married women alone. 
 
 
Modeling whether women are employed 
 
Our definition of work in this paper includes all paid and unpaid work done by women: in the 
family, for outsiders, and self-employment (work_status). Work_status is equal to 1 if the 
woman is in any of these three categories and is equal to 0 if she is not. Since this is a binary 
decision, we estimate the model using probit methodology. This labor force participation of 
the woman i, is modeled as follows:  
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Where X1 includes individual characteristics (such as age, education, marital status),
3 X2 is 
geographic characteristics (type of place); X3 includes household characteristics (household 
size, presence of children, presence of elders, and ownership of assets). In addition, we 
include X4 (social institutions such as religion and ethnicity), and X5, which includes measures 
of household gender attitudes (a woman’s experience of female genital mutilation and marital 
status). In the sample of married women, we also include variables that reflect the woman’s 
position relative to her husband (her age and education relative to her husband).  
 
 
Type of work done by women 
 
To analyze the type of work women perform (work_type), we model four labor market 
options: not participating in the labor market (coded 0); working in a family farm or 
enterprise (coded 1); working for an outsider (coded 2); and working as a self-employed 
individual (coded 3). Since these choices are discrete and cannot be ranked, we model them 
using a multinomial logit methodology. Thus, work_type is modeled as: 
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Within the estimation, nonworking (0) is considered as the base category, implying that the 
results of each equation in a set have to be interpreted relative to this category.  
 
 
DATA 
 
Our data are from the Kenyan DHS, 2008–9. The DHSs collect nationally representative data 
on demographic and health indicators for individuals in the reproductive age group and their 
families. This dataset provides comprehensive information on women’s education, 
employment status and occupation, marital status, sexual activity, fertility preferences, and so 
forth. The 2008–9 DHS for Kenya collected information on demographic and health issues 
from a sample of 8,444 women ages 15 to 49. For the purpose of our analysis, only women 
between 21–49 years old have been included in our sample. The lower limit was determined 
by the fact that 76 percent of respondents aged15 to 20 years were not employed. Thus, our 
sample includes 6,273 women. 
As shown in Table A2 of the supplemental online Appendix,4 the average woman in 
our sample is 32 years old, married, and has completed primary school. Of the women in our 
sample, 56.8 percent were employed. Women were more likely to be self-employed (42.5 
percent) or to stay at home and do household chores (33.2 percent), rather than work for 
external employers (19.8 percent), or for a family member (4.5 percent). There is some 
discussion in the literature regarding whether the categories “not working” and “working for 
a family member” really are separable (Elson 1999; Morrisson and Jutting 2005), especially 
when the work for a family member is unpaid. To start with, it is likely that different women 
may interpret the same work differently. Equally, work for the family is less likely to have an 
impact on the autonomy of the woman and the kinds of decisions she makes. We have 
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therefore separated out four categories with the caveat that there might be fuzziness between 
not working and working for a family member. To the extent that women who are classified 
as “not working” are actually working for a family member, it might underestimate the level 
of employment among women and bias the coefficients of the “working for family” option to 
look more like the “not working” category. 
 
 
Empirical estimation 
 
Both of our models – the probability of work (Model 1) and the type of work (Model 2) – 
include a range of controls common in studies of this kind including the age of the woman, 
her education level, whether she lives in a rural or urban region, size of household, number of 
children of different ages, dependency ratio (household members over 60 years old), whether 
the woman has moved in recent years, and land and house ownership. These variables control 
for family life-cycle, the presence of dependents, and the availability of childcare within the 
family (from elderly people, for instance). In addition, we include two variables that capture 
social norms (ethnicity and religion) and a range of predetermined proxies for gender 
attitudes within the household. 
 
 
Methodological issue: Reverse causality 
 
As mentioned earlier, there is the potential for causality to work both ways from gender 
attitudes to work choices and vice versa. In an attempt to mitigate this reverse causality, we 
have chosen proxies that pre-date the woman’s employment as much as possible. The proxies 
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we use are the woman’s experience of female genital mutilations (FGMs), age at which she 
first got married, the kind of marriage she is in (polygyny), and her age and education 
difference with her spouse (Relative Age and Relative Education). Among these, the 
woman’s experience of FGMs is likely to be predetermined because it will have been 
undertaken when the woman was very young. However, to the extent that it is a measure of 
conservatism, it might be related in turn to the woman’s ethnicity, and our use of this proxy 
could conflate the two effects. In what follows we will discuss the validity of the other 
proxies.  
Given that women have to navigate their employment decisions within the household 
to begin with, variables, which reflect their intrahousehold position, are very important to our 
analysis. To validate our proxies, we need to establish that for most women, the paid work 
they performed is unlikely to have influenced their choice of partner and therefore is unlikely 
to have influenced our intrahousehold proxies (Relative Age and Relative Education). In our 
sample, 76 percent of women only started working after they were 20 years old and with a 
further 7.5 percent of women working only for their families, more than 83 percent of women 
were not doing work that might have influenced their choice of partners. In addition, around 
69 percent of women were already married by the time they were 20 years old, and 92 
percent of women were married by age 25. Given this, it seems likely that for the vast 
majority of women in Kenya, the proxies we have chosen for gender attitudes are likely to be 
predetermined.  
The case is further reinforced by the fact that institutions and attitudes are generally 
“slow moving” (Roland 2004:[please insert page number]), so that any reverse causality 
might be expected to take longer than a few years (at least on average). Gintis (2001) and 
Bisin and Verdier (2000) see cultural preferences as being transmitted through socialization, 
a process that can be expected to take time. To the extent that endogeneity persists in our 
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estimations, our results need to be interpreted as correlations and therefore might suffer from 
bias. Below, we will consider these proxies in more detail. 
 
 
Attitudes and institutions 
 
Religion and ethnicity 
 
Many religions have traditionally identified certain family structures as ideal, privileging the 
roles of women as daughters, wives, and mothers over any role they may play outside the 
home. While the traditional (male breadwinner/female homemaker) view of women’s role in 
society is common to most religions, it seems to be more strictly followed among Muslim and 
Roman Catholic communities than by Protestant Christian communities in Kenya. It is worth 
stressing here that the male-breadwinner/ female homemaker model was not always the norm 
in Africa. In fact, there seems to be an increasing consensus that the shift toward it was at 
least in part the result of changes during colonialism (Emmanuel Akyeampong and Hippolyte 
Fofack 2014; Felix Meier zu Selhausen 2014). As with religion, social and cultural norms are 
often embedded within ethnic groups, which play an important role in Kenya. There are some 
identifiable differences across ethnic groups in their attitude to women’s autonomy and their 
freedom to undertake work.  
 
Gender attitudes 
 
In addition to religion and ethnicity, which incorporate attitudes toward a wide range of 
issues at the community level, we also include proxies that capture household-level gender 
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attitudes. These include experience of FGM, the marital status of the woman, and some 
variables that reflect her relationship with her husband (such as, her intrahousehold 
bargaining power).  
 
 
Female genital mutilations 
 
Female genital mutilations (FGMs) include all surgical procedures involving partial or total 
removal of the external genitalia or other operations to the female genital organs for cultural 
or other non-therapeutic reasons (World Health Organization and UNICEF 1997). Existing 
studies argue that within traditional patrilineal and patrilocal kinship systems, FGMs are 
practiced as forms of control over women and to reduce a woman’s sexual demands on her 
husband, thus allowing him to have several wives. These practices are enforced through the 
institution of bride price wherein an uncircumcised girl fetches a lower bride price and 
therefore represents a threat to the wealth her family can expect on her marriage (Christine J. 
Walley 1997).  
FGMs are associated with more conservative views on gender roles and the traditional 
perception of women as homemakers. Within this traditional role, work is not common, and 
therefore this norm is expected to be associated with lower employment of women; and, 
where women work, they may be more likely to work within rather than outside the house.  
 In Kenya, FGMs are practiced by various ethnic groups (Somali, Kisii, and Maasai, but 
also Embu, Kalenjin, and Meru) and involve girls between the ages of 11 and 15 (Hosken 
1982[please add this source to the references list]). Table 2 shows that the proportion of 
women who experienced FGMs in our sample in 2008–9 is highest among the Somali (99 
percent), Kisii (93 percent), and Masai (87 percent) groups, followed by the Embu, Kalenjin, 
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Meru, and Taita/Taveta groups. FGMs are less common among Kikuyu and Kamba (around 
29 percent), and almost nonexistent among Luo and Luhya.  
 Given the close correlation between ethnicity and women’s experience of FGMs, it 
might not be easy to identify their effects separately. In fact, our results indicate that when 
ethnicity is included, women’s experience of FGMs is not significant. However, in the 
absence of ethnicity from our model, FGMs become significant as a measure of 
traditionalism. 
 
(Table 2 here) 
 
Polygyny 
 
Polygyny, or the practice of men having more than one wife, has long been seen to have an 
economic rationale for the men who head kin groups in societies where women undertake 
much of the agricultural labor (Mukesh Eswaran 2014). In these societies, a large family 
provides both labor and physical security (Boserup 1970). This practice has also been 
justified as enabling the sharing of duties and chores in the household (Mumbi Mathangani 
1995). Given this rationale, it is not clear what impact (if any) it will have on women’s labor 
force participation: while it might increase employment, it may also restrict the woman to 
working within family enterprises. 
Although it cannot legally exist as a union under Kenyan civil law, and is not 
recognized in the Kenyan Marriage Act, polygyny is allowed in Muslim and customary 
marriages, which together represent 60 percent of total marriages (OECD [Please add year]). 
In our sample, 16.8 percent of married women are in a polygynous union. Polygyny is often 
associated with patriarchal relations between the sexes (Ian M. Timæus and Angela Reynar 
1998), and this is shown to be reflected in the nature of decision making.  
 18 
We therefore use polygyny as a proxy for traditional gender attitudes. We identify 
whether the woman is single, married, widowed, divorced, or separated, and, when married, 
whether she is in a monogynous or polygynous relationship. In general, we might expect 
married women to face more constraints when entering the labor market. Whether dictated by 
survival constraints or through genuine choice, single women of all kinds are likely to be able 
to make decisions independent of men’s immediate influence (Naila Kabeer 2005). In 
addition, while women in polygynous unions face more traditional norms they also have 
more adult women’s support within the household, which might help free up their time for 
entry into the labor market. Nii-Amoo F. Dodoo (1998) argues that in Kenya, the ultimate 
effects of the type of marriage on decision making regarding fertility within the family 
remain unresolved, concluding that women in polygamous marriages may have more 
decision-making autonomy than anticipated, perhaps afforded by the presence of other wives. 
Which of these effects dominates is an empirical question. Table 3 indicates that women in 
polygynous marriages have lower levels of education and marry younger, which also reflects 
the traditionalism of such unions.  
 
(Table 3 here) 
 
Intra-household gender attitudes 
 
In the sample of married women, we capture the extent of patriarchy experienced by women 
within the household by including age at first marriage, the age of the woman relative to her 
spouse, and the woman’s education relative to her spouse. These proxies have been widely 
used in the literature (Seema Vyas and Charlotte Watts 2009); the division of labor (Shannon 
N. Davis and Theodore N. Greenstein 2004; Martin Browning and Mette Gørtz 2012); and 
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other household decisions (Fredrik Carlsson, Peter Martinsson, Ping Qin, and Mattias Sutter 
2009; Uma Sarada Kambhampati 2009). 
While the woman’s absolute education level captures her own abilities, her education 
relative to her husband (Relative Education) will proxy her ability to bargain with him with 
respect to her employment (Pradeep Panda and Bina Agarwal 2005). Similarly, there is some 
evidence that the age at which the woman got married (Marriage Age) as well as the age 
difference between spouses (Relative Age) might influence the power that women wield 
within the household (Harriet B. Presser 1975; Mead Cain 1988; Anju Malhotra and Sidney 
Ruth Shuler 2005). This is particularly true when the age difference reinforces existing 
gender inequalities, which is often the case. These variables therefore capture the impact of 
inequalities (in education or maturity, for instance), which may skew the balance of power in 
the household against the woman. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
We begin by presenting the results for whether a woman undertakes work (Model 1), 
followed by our results for the type of work a woman performs (Model 2). We use two 
samples to estimate each of these models – the full sample of women in the dataset and the 
sample of (once) married women only. We also estimate five versions of each model: 
Version 1 with only religion and ethnicity; Version 2 with religion and gender attitude 
variables (FGMs, marital status, and intrahousehold marital variables); Version 3 with 
ethnicity and gender attitude variables; Version 4, which includes religion, ethnicity, and the 
other gender attitude variables; and Version 5, which drops both ethnicity and religion and 
only includes the gender attitude variables. Here, we present only the results for Versions 1 
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and 4. The complete set of results is in the supplemental online Appendix. In the rest of this 
paper, we will only discuss the results for the variables of interest to us – those for 
sociocultural institutions and gender attitudes. As William H. Greene (2007) recommends, we 
interpret the size of the marginal effects, but we refer to the significance level of the 
coefficients.  
 
 
What determines whether women undertake paid work in Kenya? 
 
To analyze whether women undertake paid work, we estimate a simple probit model. Results 
are displayed in Table 4. 
 
(Table 4 here) 
 
In Version 1 estimated on the all women sample (first two columns of Table 4), we find that 
both religion and ethnicity are significant. In particular, Protestant women and women with 
no religion are more likely to be employed than Catholic women (the baseline category). 
Muslim women are less likely to be employed than Catholic women. These results also 
indicate that only Embu and Kisii women have similar or a higher probability of employment 
as the baseline Kikuyu women. Women from all other ethnic groups are significantly less 
likely to be employed than Kikuyu women.  
In Versions 2 and 3 (see supplemental online Appendix), we dropped Ethnicity and 
Religion, respectively, but we included proxies for gender attitudes (type of marriage and 
experience of FGMs). In both cases, religion and ethnicity have a larger impact than in 
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Version 1 leading us to conclude that these variables are capturing some of the effect of the 
excluded variable.  
In the all-inclusive Version 4, we see that the signs of the coefficients are the same as 
in Version 1, and their size is (in most cases) only marginally changed. Thus, even where 
gender attitude proxies are significant, their impact is not sufficiently large to influence the 
size of the religion and ethnicity coefficients. The marital status variables are significantly 
correlated with the probability of paid work. Thus, women in monogynous unions are 0.05 
percent less likely to be employed than women who are not married. Divorced women are 11 
percent more likely to be employed, and separated women are almost 9 percent more likely to 
be employed than never-married women.  
Dropping all religion and ethnicity variables and looking only at the impact of gender 
norms in Version 5 (see supplemental online Appendix), we find that there is a significant 
change in the size of the coefficients leading us to conclude that these variables are picking 
up at least some of the effect of Religion and Ethnicity. 
When we exclude Ethnicity and Religion respectively, we find that the coefficients of 
marital status increase in magnitude. Finally, experience of FGMs becomes significant and 
negative only in Versions 2 and 5 when we drop Ethnicity, indicating once again that its 
impact is largely subsumed in this variable. To the extent that it has an impact, women who 
are circumcised are less likely to work. 
Our results therefore indicate that religion and ethnicity are reasonably good proxies 
for gender attitudes. However, their significance does not help explain which aspects of these 
institutions influence women’s employment status. Unpacking them to include a woman’s 
experience of FGMs and marital status separately helps to distinguish the specific effects. 
In the married women’s sample (last two columns of Table 4), once again, the impact 
of Religion and Ethnicity is similar to that for All Women. In this sample we are able to 
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include a wider range of gender attitude variables: Polygyny, FGMs, Relative Age, and 
Marriage Age (Versions 2 to 5). Women in polygynous marriages are 0.6 percent more likely 
to work than those in monogynous marriages in Version 4. Similarly, the older and more 
educated women are relative to their husbands, the more likely they are to be employed. 
Relative Education has a significant positive effect in all of the models though the size of the 
coefficient falls to 0.5 percent once Religion is included in Version 4.  
In this sample, dropping Religion and Ethnicity makes a small difference to the 
significance of the individual autonomy variables (Polygyny, Relative Education). In 
addition, experience of FGMs is never significant leading us to conclude that once women 
are married, their employment status seems to be correlated to their status relative to their 
husband rather than to other factors.  
Including the level of formal sector employment as a control for the demand for labor, 
we find that it has a large negative impact on the employment of women in both samples. 
Thus, increased demand for labor seems to be associated with increased employment for men 
and to decrease the pressure on women to be employed. For every 1 percent increase in the 
level of formal employment in the economy, there is a 0.5 percent decrease in the likelihood 
of married women being employed. The size of this coefficient is larger in the married 
women’s sample, leading us to conclude that this effect is larger when women are in 
households with male breadwinners. 
 
 
What influences the type of paid work women choose? 
 
To answer question 2 regarding the choice between different types of paid work for women, 
we estimate a multinomial logit model. In Table 5, we present the results for versions 1 and 4 
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for each of the three paid work choices (work for family, work for outsiders, and work for 
self), relative to the base category (no work).  
Our results (Version 1) indicate that Embu and Kisii women are more likely than 
Kikuyu women (our base category) to work for the family. Women from all other ethnic 
groups are generally less likely. We also find that Embu women are not significantly more 
likely to work for outsiders or for themselves, and Kisii women are the only group 
significantly more likely than Kikuyu women to work for themselves. Muslim women are 
less likely to work for outsiders or well for themselves than are Catholic women (our base 
category). Protestant women are marginally more likely to be self-employed. 
 
(Table 5 here) 
 
When dropping Ethnicity and Religion, respectively (Versions 2 and 3, see supplemental 
online appendix), the results do not change significantly. Version 4 of the model includes 
Religion, Ethnicity, and proxies for intra-household gender attitudes: in particular, the 
woman’s experience of FGMs and her marital status. Our results indicate that there is no 
major change in the effect of Ethnicity and Religion. Marital status is significant: both 
polygynous and monogynous women are less likely to undertake paid work for outsiders and 
more likely to work for themselves than women who have never been married (our base 
category). The magnitude of this effect is larger for polygynous women than for monogynous 
women. Widows and divorcees are also significantly more likely to be self-employed, 
whereas women who are separated are more likely both to work for outsiders and for 
themselves. These results lead us to conclude that single women are most likely to undertake 
paid work for outsiders and least likely to be self-employed. 
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As before, women’s experience of FGMs is insignificant in all cases except in 
Version 2 when we drop ethnicity. Women who are circumcised are more likely to undertake 
paid work for the family and less likely to work for outsiders or for themselves. Thus, the 
impact of FGMs is subsumed in the Ethnicity variable. In Version 3 where we drop Religion, 
we find that the variable capturing experience of FGMs remains insignificant indicating that 
it is more closely linked to Ethnicity than to Religion.  
Finally, we turn to the type of paid work undertaken in the sample of married women 
(last two columns of Table 5). Our results for Religion and Ethnicity confirm those in earlier 
estimations. Turning to Version 4, where we include marital status variables and experience 
of FGMs as well as intrahousehold variables, we find that polygynous women are more likely 
to be self-employed than monogynous women, though the probability of working for family 
or outsiders is not significantly different between the two groups. 
Our results indicate that the older the woman when she first gets married, the less 
likely she is to be self-employed. However, Marriage Age is not significantly correlated with 
working for the family or for outsiders: higher age at first marriage is not associated with 
increased likelihood of employment (either for family, outsiders, or self). This is a surprising 
result because age at first marriage is often seen as a measure of how autonomous women are 
likely to be in their marriages. In fact, from Table 4, we can also see that age at first marriage 
is not associated with any increase in the probability of employment.  
Again, our results indicate that when women are closer to their husbands in age, they 
are marginally more likely to undertake paid work for outsiders. Though a smaller age gap is 
not significantly associated with increased work for the family or for self, when women are 
close to their husbands in education, then we see that they are more likely to be working, 
either for the family, outsiders or themselves. Thus, we can conclude that the most 
empowering attribute is education.  
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Dropping Ethnicity in Version 2 (see supplemental online appendix) makes very little 
difference to these results for married women, though it does reveal that women who are 
circumcised are much more likely to undertake paid work only for their families. Once again, 
we can conclude that Ethnicity and experience of FGMs are closely correlated, and that the 
traditionalism associated with FGMs reveals itself in employment only within families.  
Overall, our results indicate that Religion and Ethnicity significantly influence 
women’s employment choices in Kenya. Dropping Ethnicity reveals the significance of 
FGMs indicating that this is a potential proxy for women’s autonomy, in particular among 
unmarried women. In the sample of married women, however, it is the woman’s autonomy 
relative to her husband that is crucial in influencing her work choices. In this sample, 
therefore, the most important factor is Relative Education rather than the woman being 
circumcised. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we considered the impact of sociocultural institutions on women’s labor market 
participation, focusing on religion and ethnicity as well as the gendered institutions that 
reflect patriarchal attitudes. While there is significant endogeneity in the extent of 
traditionalism of communities and decisions made regarding women’s paid work, we are 
unable to correct for this using instrumental variable methods. We therefore try to identify 
proxies for traditional gender attitudes, which are less likely to suffer reverse causality in the 
context of Kenya where most women marry young and delay entering the workforce.  
Our results lead us to conclude that, in Kenya, both religion and ethnicity are strongly 
correlated with women’s probability of being employed, as is the type of work they do. While 
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experience of FGMs is a good proxy for traditionalism, its impact is almost entirely 
subsumed within ethnicity, and it loses significance when included together with this 
variable. Marital status is always significantly related to women’s employment status, with 
single women being most likely to work for outsiders and least likely to be self-employed. 
Polygyny is correlated with an increase in the probability of women working – both for the 
family and for themselves – but with a decrease in the probability of women working for 
outsiders. Finally, intrahousehold relativities between spouses are significant: women are 
more likely to work in households where their education levels are similar to that of their 
spouses, and they are more likely to work for outsiders in households where the age 
difference between the spouses is small. Thus, these variables seem to have an empowering 
effect. Importantly, age at first marriage does not appear to be significant so increasing the 
statutory age at marriage is unlikely to be helpful. 
Our study leads us to conclude that sociocultural institutions and gender attitudes are 
significantly correlated with women’s labor market participation. Given that the latter is 
significant in influencing women’s well-being and that of their families, it is important to ask 
what might be done to encourage labor market participation or loosen the constraints placed 
by gender attitudes. Institutions and attitudes are hard to influence in the short run. While 
economic development may help, some policy action is required. It is worth noting here that 
women have traditionally tended to undertake paid work in Africa, and the change toward the 
male-breadwinner model is increasingly being seen as a postcolonial development. Any 
future changes need to be seen in this context. Thus, labor market policies that tackle 
women’s employment more directly may also help by reestablishing a norm for women’s 
employment and thereby loosening gender attitudes. In Kenya, the ban on FGOs in 2001 is 
likely to help challenge gender stereotypes within communities. Similarly, more recent 
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changes in the marriage law or the reservation of quotas for women in parliament may also 
help change attitudes in a more durable way.   
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 Women’s employment status across religions and ethnic groups, KDHS 2008–9 
 
Not working (%) 
Working for 
family (%) 
Working for 
outsider (%) 
Self-employed 
(%) 
Total  
Religion 
     Roman Catholic 29.7 5.0 22.2 43.1 1,224 
Protestant/other Christian 26.4 5.0 22.8 45.8 3,873 
Muslim 63.6 2.2   6.9 27.3 965 
No religion 29.5 2.1   7.5 61.0 146 
Other religion 67.9 1.8 16.1 14.3 56 
Total 33.2 4.5 19.8 42.5 6,264 
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Ethnicity 
Kikuyu 19.8 5.4 27.9 46.9 1,192 
Embu 13.9 16.5 24.4 45.2 115 
Kalenjin 28.2 3.6 19.3 48.8 549 
Kamba 32.3 2.4 26.3 39.0 498 
Kisii 16.6 12.3 18.1 53.0 349 
Luhya 32.9 2.4 21.2 43.5 917 
Luo 24.5 7.1 19.3 49.1 787 
Masai 59.8 4.9 8.5 26.8 82 
Meru 29.1 4.4 25.7 40.9 296 
Mijikenda/Swahili 37.6 1.4 12.8 48.2 508 
Somali 80.0 1.9 3.2 14.8 466 
Taita/Taveta 45.2 1.0 25.0 28.9 104 
Other 53.9 2.5 11.2 32.5 403 
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Total 33.3 4.5 19.8 42.5 6,266 
Source: Calculated using the 2008–9 KDHS 
 
Table 2 FGMs by ethnicity, KDHS 2008–9 
 
Ethnicity 
Number of 
women who 
have 
experienced 
FGMs 
% of 
women who 
have 
experienced 
FGMs 
Kikuyu 1,185 28.86 
Embu 115 55.65 
Kalenjin 548 52.01 
Kamba 493 29.01 
Kisii 349 93.41 
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Luhya 890 0.34 
Luo 729 0.41 
Masai 82 86.59 
Meru 295 42.71 
Mijikenda/Swahili 410 6.34 
Somali 465 99.35 
Taita/Taveta 102 40.20 
Other  49.45 
Total  34.38 
Source: Calculated using the 2008–9 KDHS 
 
Table 3 Selected indicators for women in polygynous and monogynous union, KDHS 2008–9 
Polygamy 
 
Level of 
education 
Level of 
education relative 
to the partner 
Age at marriage 
Age relative to 
the partner 
Number of 
children born 
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In monogamous union 
N 3,759 (83.24%) 3,323 3,759 3,759 3,759 
Mean 1.282 0.906 19.414 0.836 3.674 
SD 0.827 0.502 4.096 0.120 2.374 
In polygamous union 
N 757 (16.76%) 512 757 757 757 
Mean 0.777 0.810 18.317 0.762 5.005 
SD 0.732 0.666 4.487 0.159 2.665 
Total 
N 4,516 (100%) 3,835 4,516 4,516 4,516 
Mean 1.198 0.893 19.230 0.823 3.897 
SD 0.833 0.528 4.184 0.130 2.475 
Source: Calculated using the 2008–9 KDHS 
 
Table 4 Determinants of women’s employment (marginal effects, s.e.); V1 (religion, ethnicity); and V4 (religion, ethnicity, gender norms) 
 
Variable All women sample (Once) Married 
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(margins, s.e.) women sample 
(margins, s.e.) 
V1 V4 V1 V4 
Religion=Protestant  0.028*  0.031*  0.045**  0.047** 
 0.046  0.047  0.050  0.058 
Religion=Muslim -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.111*** -0.077* 
 0.089  0.094  0.093  0.124 
Religion=none  0.103**  0.129***  0.107**  0.184*** 
 0.133  0.154  0.139  0.240 
Religion=other -0.335*** -0.324*** -0.354*** -0.450*** 
 0.203  0.234  0.218  0.279 
Ethnicity=Embu  0.046  0.050  0.004  0.034 
 0.157  0.161  0.167  0.189 
Ethnicity=Kalenjin -0.054** -0.053** -0.066** -0.078*** 
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 0.075  0.076  0.083  0.094 
Ethnicity=Kamba -0.112*** -0.104*** -0.112*** -0.138*** 
 0.075  0.076  0.083  0.091 
Ethnicity=Kisii  0.063**  0.070**  0.088***  0.076** 
 0.095  0.102  0.111  0.126 
Ethnicity=Luhya -0.127*** -0.146*** -0.123*** -0.150*** 
 0.066  0.070  0.072  0.086 
Ethnicity=Luo -0.019 -0.036 -0.023 -0.041 
 0.069  0.074  0.075  0.092 
Ethnicity=Maasai -0.344*** -0.351*** -0.388*** -0.386*** 
 0.158  0.162  0.164  0.214 
Ethnicity=Meru -0.100*** -0.093*** -0.121*** -0.165*** 
 0.091  0.092  0.099  0.109 
Ethnicity=Mijikenda/Swa -0.042 -0.030 -0.054* -0.060 
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hili  0.096  0.105  0.102  0.131 
Ethnicity=Somali -0.438*** -0.416*** -0.481*** -0.491*** 
 0.130  0.135  0.138  0.209 
Ethnicity=Taita/Taveta -0.283*** -0.274*** -0.352*** -0.304*** 
 0.135  0.138  0.151  0.167 
Ethnicity=other -0.218*** -0.217*** -0.250*** -0.197*** 
 0.094  0.098  0.101  0.134 
Rate of formal 
employment (at regional 
level) 
-0.513*** -0.496*** -0.706*** -0.861*** 
 0.417  0.426  0.484  0.552 
In monogamous union   -0.055**     
   0.063     
In polygamous union    0.024    0.055** 
   0.086    0.076 
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Divorced    0.113**     
   0.172     
Separated    0.088***     
   0.101     
Woman has experience of 
FGMs 
  -0.021    0.001 
   0.054    0.067 
Age at (first) marriage       -0.003 
       0.007 
Relative age 
(wife/husband) 
       0.122* 
       0.208 
relative education 
(wife/husband) 
       0.048** 
       0.060 
          
Observations  6,130  5,891  5,312  3,697 
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ll -3352 -3174 -2864 -2021 
chi2  953.6  968.2  898.5  449.2 
r2_p  0.139  0.150 0.154  0.111 
Notes: Values represent marginal effects and s.e. Controls are for: age, age squared, type of place of residence (rural or urban), education 
level, household size, number of children in various age categories, number of adults over age 60 in household, land and house ownership, and 
proportion of life lived in the place of residence. Married women’s sample relates only to women who have been married once (including 
married, cohabiting, widowed, divorced, or separated). Standard errors relate to the coefficients not the marginal effects, as Greene (2007) 
recommends. Robust standard errors; ***, **,  and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively [Correct?]. 
 
Table 5 Determinants of type of work (marginal effects, s.e.); V1 (religion, ethnicity); and V4 (religion, ethnicity, gender norms) 
 
Variable 
Work for family Work for outsider Work for self 
All women sample 
(margins, s.e.) 
(Once) Married 
women sample 
(margins, s.e.) 
All women sample 
(margins, s.e.) 
(Once) Married 
women sample 
(margins, s.e.) 
All women sample 
(margins, s.e.) 
(Once) Married 
women sample 
(margins, s.e.) 
V1 V4 V1 V4 V1 V4 V1 V4 V1 V4 V1 V4 
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Religion=Prot
estant 
-0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.013** 0.015** 0.026* 0.024* 0.028** 0.025** 
0.167 0.170 0.185 0.222 0.101 0.104 0.118 0.142 0.084 0.086 0.090 0.103 
Religion=Mus
lim 0.020 0.019 0.025 0.019 
-
0.072**
* 
-
0.062**
* 
-
0.048**
* 
-
0.03816 
-
0.050**
* 
-
0.058**
* 
-
0.068**
* 
-0.044 
0.429 0.480 0.454 0.624 0.236 0.251 0.266 0.340 0.160 0.170 0.163 0.215 
Religion=non
e 
-0.009 -0.017 -0.003 
-
0.04*** 
-0.070 -0.059 
-
0.05913 
-0.050 
0.165**
* 
0.184**
* 
0.155**
* 
0.263**
* 
0.683 0.772 0.684 0.504 0.414 0.469 0.453 0.687 0.227 0.258 0.233 0.393 
Religion=othe
r -0.011 0.004 0.009 0.033 
-
0.108**
* 
-
0.116**
* 
-
0.097**
* 
-
0.115**
* 
-
0.157**
* 
-
0.136** 
-
0.191**
* 
-
0.266**
* 
1.154 1.151 1.081 1.232 0.451 0.577 0.536 0.734 0.422 0.466 0.429 0.571 
Ethnicity=Em 0.075** 0.077** 0.048 0.026 0.041 0.038 0.021 0.042 -0.079 -0.070 -0.069 -0.038 
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bu * 
0.383 0.390 0.434 0.498 0.346 0.360 0.387 0.442 0.303 0.308 0.311 0.357 
Ethnicity=Kal
enjin 
-
0.029**
* 
-
0.030**
* 
-
0.043**
* 
-
0.054**
* 
0.015 0.011 0.018 0.007 
-
0.043** 
-
0.036** 
-
0.047**
* 
-
0.037**
* 
0.287 0.288 0.334 0.436 0.171 0.176 0.203 0.242 0.136 0.138 0.148 0.166 
Ethnicity=Ka
mba 
-
0.041**
* 
-
0.040**
* 
-
0.058**
* 
-
0.067**
* 
0.021** 0.030 0.051 0.054 
-
0.102**
* 
-
0.105**
* 
-
0.115**
* 
-
0.128**
* 
0.352 0.357 0.445 0.521 0.162 0.167 0.186 0.212 0.139 0.140 0.149 0.163 
Ethnicity=Kisi
i 
0.056**
* 
0.058**
* 
0.057**
* 
0.04** -0.040 -0.031 -0.011 -0.014 0.040** 0.038** 0.035** 0.043** 
0.269 0.301 0.306 0.366 0.216 0.238 0.253 0.300 0.177 0.188 0.210 0.235 
Ethnicity=Luh - - - - - 0.003** 0.021** 0.020** - - - -
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ya 0.043**
* 
0.043**
* 
0.053**
* 
0.06*** 0.001**
* 
* 0.088**
* 
0.108**
* 
0.097**
* 
0.113**
* 
0.288 0.301 0.318 0.393 0.144 0.154 0.166 0.206 0.121 0.130 0.131 0.156 
Ethnicity=Luo 
0.006 
-
0.00198 
0.003 -0.019* -0.015 0.001 -0.006 0.017 -0.019 
-
0.045** 
-
0.02916 
-0.048* 
0.235 0.259 0.257 0.314 0.153 0.165 0.181 0.230 0.127 0.138 0.136 0.165 
Ethnicity=Ma
asai -0.014* -0.014* 
-
0.023** 
-0.009* 
-
0.060**
* 
-
0.049**
* 
-
0.090**
* 
-
0.084**
* 
-
0.252**
* 
-
0.264**
* 
-
0.273**
* 
-
0.288**
* 
0.609 0.622 0.639 0.676 0.461 0.473 0.626 0.818 0.302 0.311 0.298 0.398 
Ethnicity=Mer
u 
-
0.025** 
-
0.022** 
-
0.04*** 
-
0.039**
* 
0.054 0.057 0.065 0.022* 
-
0.137**
* 
-
0.139**
* 
-
0.154**
* 
-
0.15*** 
0.367 0.369 0.399 0.420 0.195 0.198 0.225 0.269 0.169 0.169 0.179 0.192 
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Ethnicity=Mij
ikenda/Swahil
i 
-
0.053**
* 
-
0.051**
* 
-
0.065**
* 
-
0.059** 
0.008 0.017 0.015 0.045 0.010 0.005 
-
0.00119 
-0.048 
0.565 0.633 0.638 0.800 0.232 0.254 0.260 0.326 0.172 0.189 0.179 0.229 
Ethnicity=So
mali 
-
0.047**
* 
-
0.046**
* 
-
0.067**
* 
-
0.078**
* 
-
0.068**
* 
-0.037 
-
0.051**
* 
0.04600
4 
-
0.317**
* 
-
0.311**
* 
-
0.353**
* 
-
0.401**
* 
0.646 0.685 0.675 0.719 0.382 
0.406**
* 
0.437 0.540 0.243 0.251 0.254 0.414 
Ethnicity=Tait
a/Taveta 
-
0.052** 
-
0.065**
* 
-
0.076**
* 
-
0.078**
* 
-
0.030**
* 
-
0.017**
* 
-
0.020**
* 
0.005** 
-
0.194**
* 
-
0.183**
* 
-
0.252**
* 
-
0.23*** 
1.027 0.229 0.240 0.273 0.267 0.280 0.325 0.369 0.266 0.271 0.288 0.316 
Ethnicity=oth - - - - - - - - - - - -
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er 0.035**
* 
0.036**
* 
0.052**
* 
0.049**
* 
0.063**
* 
0.049**
* 
0.058**
* 
0.050**
* 
0.120**
* 
0.129**
* 
0.14*** 0.097**
* 
0.478 0.503 0.538 0.666 0.249 0.256 0.291 0.383 0.171 0.178 0.178 0.232 
Rate of formal 
employment 
(at regional 
level) 
-
0.096** 
-
0.073** 
-
0.21*** 
-
0.306**
* 
0.325 0.250 0.245 0.148* 
-
0.870**
* 
-
0.781**
* 
-
0.787**
* 
-
0.741**
* 
1.968 2.020 2.499 2.718 0.855 0.881 1.039 1.211 0.807 0.827 0.901 1.023 
In 
monogamous 
union 
  
-
0.019** 
      
-
0.154**
* 
      0.148**     
  0.220       0.135       0.127     
In 
polygamous 
union 
  -0.007   0.004   
-
0.187**
* 
  -0.048   
0.229**
* 
  
0.093**
* 
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  0.307   0.278   0.220   0.227   0.162   0.133 
Widowed 
  -0.008       -0.094       
0.173**
* 
    
  0.369       0.242       0.208     
Divorced 
  -0.006       -0.022       
0.152**
* 
    
  0.535       0.366       0.348     
Separated 
  -0.021       
0.030**
* 
      
0.091**
* 
    
  0.360       0.208       0.200     
Woman has 
experience of 
FGMs 
  -0.002   -0.004   -0.007   0.003   -0.015   -0.0018 
  0.198   0.250   0.127   0.169   0.097   0.117 
Age at (first)       -0.001       0.004       -0.006* 
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marriage       0.027       0.017       0.013 
Relative age 
(wife/husband
) 
      -0.005       0.062*       0.053 
      1.086       0.534       0.362 
Relative 
education 
(wife/husband
) 
      0.004*       
0.033**
* 
      0.009* 
      0.161       0.135       0.113 
             
Observations                 6,125 5,888 5,308 3,695 
ll                 -6230 -5880 -5257 -3669 
chi2                 1706 13895 10420 19093 
r2_p                 0.143 0.160 0.141 0.132 
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 Notes: Values represent marginal effects and s.e. Controls are for: age, age squared, type of place of residence (rural or urban), education 
level, household size, number of children in various age categories, number of adults over age 60 in household, land and house ownership, and 
proportion of life lived in the place of residence. Married women’s sample relates only to women who have been married once (including 
married, cohabiting, widowed, divorced, or separated). Standard errors relate to the coefficients not the marginal effects, as Greene (2007) 
recommends. Robust standard errors; ***, **,  and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Of course, it is possible that religion itself is not entirely exogenous, given that an 
individual’s choice of religion and a household’s choice to perform FGMs may be correlated 
with each other and with conservatism more generally (Joshua D. Angrist and Jörn-Steffen 
Pischke 2009). 
2 Research conducted by the ILO stresses that women’s economic autonomy is considered to 
be highest when they are engaged in wage and salaried work or are employers, lower if they 
are own-account workers, and lowest when they are unpaid family workers (ILO 2008).  
3 While information on whether her mother was educated and/or worked would have been 
useful in considering the influence on the women’s own attitudes, these data are not made 
available in the dataset. 
4 The supplemental online Appendix is available under the Supplemental Tab on the 
publisher’s website. 
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